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OPINION*
____________
FISHER, Circuit Judge.
One Saturday night at a bar in Meadville, a man sucker-punched a patron and then
walked out. The patron, Rhet Happel, was a student at Allegheny College. He was
severely injured. The Meadville police began investigating the assault. A few days later,
Officer Jared Frum interviewed another Allegheny student, Duncan Freeland. According
to Officer Frum’s incident report, Freeland said that a photo of plaintiff Kobe Pinkney
“looked an awful lot like” the assailant.1 As a result of Freeland’s identification, Pinkney
was arrested for the assault, but the charges were later withdrawn. Pinkney then sued
Officer Frum and others under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violation of his constitutional rights.
Frum moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing he is entitled to qualified immunity. The
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This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7
does not constitute binding precedent.
1
App. 73.
2

District Court denied the motion. Frum appeals. We will vacate and remand.2
Officer Frum argues that the District Court erred in denying his motion to dismiss
on qualified immunity grounds. To determine whether qualified immunity applies, “we
ask (1) whether the officer violated a constitutional right, and (2) whether the right was
clearly established, such that ‘it would [have been] clear to a reasonable officer that his
conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted.’”3
Because this appeal comes to us at the motion to dismiss stage, the first qualified
immunity question, stated more precisely, is whether the complaint states a claim for a
constitutional violation.4 As relevant to this appeal, Pinkney’s claims against Frum are for
false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution.5 All these claims are based
on a lack of probable cause, so “the constitutional violation question in this case turns on
whether ‘a reasonable officer could have believed that probable cause existed to arrest’

2

The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331(federal questions)
and 1343 (civil rights actions). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (final
decisions of district courts). It is “well established” that, under the collateral order
doctrine, “a district court’s order rejecting qualified immunity at the motion-to-dismiss
stage of a proceeding is a ‘final decision’ within the meaning of § 1291.” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 672 (2009). We review the District Court’s decision de novo. Dennis
v. City of Phila., 19 F.4th 279, 284 (3d Cir. 2021).
3
Lamont v. New Jersey, 637 F.3d 177, 182 (3d Cir. 2011) (alteration in original)
(quoting Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201–02 (2001)).
4
See James v. City of Wilkes-Barre, 700 F.3d 675, 679–80 (3d Cir. 2012).
5
False arrest is arrest without probable cause. Harvard v. Cesnalis, 973 F.3d 190,
199 (3d Cir. 2020). False imprisonment occurs where the police detain someone pursuant
to an arrest that lacked probable cause. Id. at 202. Malicious prosecution is a criminal
proceeding initiated without probable cause that ends in the plaintiff’s favor, where the
defendants acted maliciously and the plaintiff was deprived of his liberty. Id. at 203.
3

the plaintiff at that time.”6 Therefore, we consider whether the complaint adequately
alleges a lack of probable cause.
Police may not make an arrest except “upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation.”7 There is probable cause to arrest “whenever reasonably trustworthy
information or circumstances within a police officer’s knowledge are sufficient to
warrant a person of reasonable caution to conclude that an offense has been committed by
the person being arrested.”8 A “credible report from a credible eyewitness” typically
“establish[es] probable cause to arrest.”9
Pinkney was arrested pursuant to a warrant. A plaintiff in such a case must show
“(1) that the police officer ‘knowingly and deliberately, or with a reckless disregard for
the truth, made false statements or omissions that create a falsehood in applying for a
warrant;’ and (2) that ‘such statements or omissions are material, or necessary, to the
finding of probable cause.’”10
The District Court examined Officer Frum’s incident report, which is an internal

6

See Andrews v. Scuilli, 853 F.3d 690, 697 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting Blaylock v.
City of Phila., 504 F.3d 405, 411 (3d Cir. 2007)) (discussing false arrest and malicious
prosecution); Harvard, 973 F.3d at 199 (explaining that false imprisonment charges fail if
there was probable cause).
7
U.S. Const. amend. IV.
8
Andrews, 853 F.3d at 701 n.13 (quoting United States v. Myers, 308 F.3d 251,
255 (3d Cir. 2002)).
9
Merkle v. Upper Dublin Sch. Dist., 211 F.3d 782, 790 (3d Cir. 2000).
10
Wilson v. Russo, 212 F.3d 781, 786–87 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting Sherwood v.
Mulvihill, 113 F.3d 396, 399 (3d Cir. 1997)).
4

police department document, and his probable cause affidavit, which he submitted to a
Pennsylvania judge to obtain the warrant to arrest Pinkney. Both of those documents
were attached to the complaint. Officer Frum wrote in the incident report that Freeland
said Pinkney “looked an awful lot like” the assailant.11 But Frum’s affidavit stated, in
definitive fashion, that Freeland “recognized Pinkney as the black male that punched
Happel.”12 The District Court held that in light of this difference, the complaint
adequately alleged that Officer Frum made a material false statement in the affidavit with
reckless disregard for the truth.
To his motion to dismiss, Officer Frum attached the audio recording of his
interview with Freeland. The District Court, without explanation, declined to consider it.
Officer Frum argues the District Court should have considered the recording and, further,
that we should consider it on appeal. He says the recording shows Freeland identified
Pinkney definitively, not equivocally. Therefore, he contends, the complaint does not
succeed in alleging that he recklessly disregarded the truth in his affidavit or that he
lacked probable cause to arrest Pinkney.
In deciding a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6),
the district court “may consider only the allegations contained in the pleading.”13

11

App. 73.
App. 176.
13
In re Asbestos Prods. Liab. Litig. (No. VI), 822 F.3d 125, 133 (3d Cir. 2016)
(quoting Santomenno ex rel. John Hancock Tr. v. John Hancock Life Ins. Co., 768 F.3d
284, 290 (3d Cir. 2014)).
12

5

Although this rule is “phrased in relatively strict terms, we have declined to interpret [it]
narrowly.”14 We have held that “courts may consider ‘document[s] integral to or
explicitly relied upon in the complaint,’ or any ‘undisputedly authentic document that a
defendant attaches as an exhibit to a motion to dismiss if the plaintiff’s claims are based
on the document.’”15 Courts may consider “matters incorporated by reference or integral
to the claim, items subject to judicial notice, matters of public record, orders, [and] items
appearing in the record of the case.”16
The audio recording of Officer Frum’s interview of Freeland appears to be the
contemporaneous record of the conversation on which the incident report and the
probable cause affidavit were based. Both of those documents clearly could be
considered because they were attached to and cited in the complaint. Our case law
establishes that “what is critical is whether the claims in the complaint are ‘based’ on an
extrinsic document and not merely whether the extrinsic document was explicitly
cited.”17 The complaint is, fundamentally, based on the Freeland interview. It was in the
interview that Freeland made the statements that either did or did not provide probable

14

Id. at 133 n.7.
Id. (first quoting In re Burlington Coat Factory Secs. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410,
1426 (3d Cir. 1997), then quoting PBGC v. White Consol. Indus., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196
(3d Cir. 1993)).
16
Buck v. Hampton Twp. Sch. Dist., 452 F.3d 256, 260 (3d Cir. 2006) (alteration
in original) (quoting 5B Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice &
Procedure § 1357 (3d ed. 2004)).
17
Burlington, 114 F.3d at 1426 (quoting In re Donald J. Trump Casino Secs.
Litig.–Taj Mahal Litig., 7 F.3d 357, 368 n.9 (3d Cir. 1993)).
15

6

cause to arrest Pinkney. The incident report and probable cause affidavit are written
summaries, but the interview is what they summarize. If authentic, the audio recording is
the best information available and should have been considered on the motion to
dismiss.18
At oral argument, Pinkney’s counsel stated that Pinkney does not stipulate to the
authenticity of the recording. Officer Frum’s counsel, in rebuttal, pointed out that
Pinkney never argued in the District Court that the recording should not be considered,
nor contested its authenticity—despite the fact that he opposed the motion to dismiss and
also filed a supplemental brief in opposition. On remand, the District Court may rule on
whether Pinkney forfeited, in that Court, the issue of whether the recording is authentic
and may be considered. If the argument is not forfeited, the District Court may determine
what next steps would be appropriate.
We will not accept Officer Frum’s invitation to consider the audio ourselves. “We
ordinarily decline to consider issues not decided by a district court, choosing instead to
allow that court to consider them in the first instance.”19
For these reasons, we will vacate the order denying dismissal and remand for
further proceedings.

18

Judge Nygaard would leave to the District Court in the first instance the
determination of whether the audio recording is integral to the complaint such that it
should be considered on a motion to dismiss, or is not, and may be considered only on a
motion for summary judgment.
19
Forestal Guarani S.A. v. Daros Int’l, Inc., 613 F.3d 395, 401 (3d Cir. 2010).
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